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Abstract
Background: Following the tenets of world polity and innovation diffusion theories, I focus on the coercive and 
mimetic forces that influence the diffusion of mental health policy across nations. International organizations’ 
mandates influence government behavior. Dependency on external resources, namely foreign aid, also affects 
governments’ formulation of national policy. And finally, mounting adoption in a region alters the risk, benefits, 
and information associated with a given policy. 
Methods: I use post-war, discrete time data spanning 1950 to 2011 and describing 193 nations’ mental health 
systems to test these diffusion mechanisms. 
Results: I find that the adoption of mental health policy is highly clustered temporally and spatially. Results provide 
support that membership in the World Health Organization (WHO), interdependence with neighbors and peers in 
regional blocs, national income status, and migrant sub-population are responsible for isomorphism. Aid, however, 
is an insufﬁcient determinant of mental health policy adoption. 
Conclusion: This study examines the extent to which mental, neurological, and substance use disorder are 
addressed in national and international contexts through the lens of policy diffusion theory. It also adds to policy 
dialogues about non-communicable diseases as nascent items on the global health agenda.
Keywords: Policy Diffusion, New Institutionalism, Mental Health
Copyright: © 2014 by Kerman University of Medical Sciences
Citation: Shen GC. Cross-national diffusion of mental health policy. Int J Health Policy Manag 2014; 3: 269–282. 
doi: 10.15171/ijhpm.2014.96
*Correspondence to:
Gordon C Shen 
Email: gordon.shen@yale.edu 
Article History:
Received: 12 June 2014
Accepted: 26 September 2014
ePublished: 4 October 2014
Original Article
School of Public Health, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA
http://ijhpm.com
Int J Health Policy Manag 2014, 3(5), 269–282 doi 10.15171/ijhpm.2014.96
Implications for policy makers
• Mental health policy is a powerful declaration governments make to address mental, neurological, and substance use disorders 
prevalent in their population.
• Membership in the World Health Organization (WHO) or the United Nations (UN) alone does not predict the adoption of national 
mental health policy, but their regional offices do have a statistically significant effect on policy adoption.
• Bilateral and multilateral aid are insufﬁcient determinants of mental health policy adoption.
• Prosperous countries are more likely to adopt a mental health policy.
• Countries with a high proportion of migrant to native population are less likely to adopt a mental health policy adoption.
Implications for public
The current study uses quantitative data to describe the rate and pattern of national mental health policy adoption across 193 nations. 
Overall, I find that the adoption of mental health policy is highly clustered temporally and spatially. The first interpretation is that the 
World Health Organization (WHO) exerts an influence on governments, particularly through their regional offices. It can thus be inferred 
that mounting adoption in a given region alters the risk, benefits, and information associated with mental health policy. The second finding 
is that aid is an insufﬁcient determinant of mental health policy adoption. Non-communicable diseases are nascent items on the global 
health agenda, and a mandate to address them is not a condition for exchanging foreign aid. And finally, direct advocacy for mental health 
has more prominent results in developed countries and countries with a sizable migrant population.  
Key Messages 
Introduction
Commonality amidst diversity is a phenomenon where 
national governments internalize certain norms and models 
salient in the global society, in turn reflected in isomorphic 
socio-political policies, structures, and programs. This study 
focuses on policy diffusion, which I define as a pattern of 
successive adoption of mental health policy across countries 
and over time that is indicative of vertical forces, or domestic 
responses to globalization events, as well as horizontal forces, 
that is, policy choices in a focal country that was caused by 
other countries. Countries are increasingly interconnected as 
information transpires across geopolitical boundaries through 
communication, collaboration, competition and other norm-
setting channels (1,2). World polity and institutional theorists 
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share a similar premise as to why: social norms and operational 
models are first invented and institutionalized within certain 
countries, spread outside of them, then eventually acquire 
legitimacy regionally or globally (3). The diffusion of mental 
health policy, like other innovations, is expected to follow a 
sigmoidal curve as countries initially adopt a given policy 
at a rapid rate, reach an inflection point, then taper off from 
adoption (4,5). This curve reflects the differences among 
nation-states in their readiness to change and propensity to 
deal with political and policy risks. 
Four mechanisms have been identified and tested in the 
policy diffusion literature: coercion, emulation, learning, 
and competition (6,7). These mechanisms can be situated 
on a coercive-voluntary continuum. On the coercive end, 
adoption of a particular policy could be attributed to 
external diffusion pressures stemming from membership in 
international organizations. Drezner’s (1) structure-based 
approach emphasizes the environmental pressures that 
tightly constrain national policy responses. For example, 
political leaders in developing countries have little choice but 
to accept conditionalities imposed on them by international 
financial institutions given the dire consequences of refusing 
debt relief and economic development aid. The magnitude 
of such environmental pressures directly determines their 
course of action, in turn leading to policy convergence among 
countries. 
Moving along the continuum from hard to soft power, the 
catalyst for voluntarily adopting certain policies is to avoid the 
defamation incurred from other countries for not preserving 
the status quo. When existing governmental policies are 
functioning properly there is no need for politicians and 
public administrators to search for lessons learned elsewhere 
because everything can operate through established 
routines. When established routines stop addressing new 
environmental contingencies, however, a search for new 
policy, planning, and/or legal solutions becomes necessary 
(8). An alternative is for decision-makers in a focal country 
to replicate the modus operandi used in other key countries 
(9). Competition is outside the scope of this study since I am 
focused on policy ratified to address the burden of mental, 
neurological, and substance use (MNS)  disorders, a problem 
bounded by geopolitical borders.
The coercion and emulation diffusion mechanisms are 
significant forms of social communication that link individual 
countries to the broader global community. This study seeks 
to advance world society and policy diffusion arguments 
through the direct testing of these two mechanisms. This 
paper is organized as follows. I will first discuss policy 
solutions for mental health problems in the Context section. 
In the Theory and Hypotheses section, the discussion shifts 
to how the world society influences countries’ behavior by 
applying external pressure on them to meet obligations to 
care for the mentally ill population. In the same section, I 
will also cover the background on countries’ likelihood of 
mimicking policy decisions made by role models in their 
regions. Historical, geographical, and structural composite 
characteristics constitute as the emulation mechanism. In the 
Methods section I will discuss how event history analysis is 
used to empirically test the predictors of successive mental 
health policy adoption. This paper closes with a discussion 
of the intersection of policy diffusion and the health sector.
Governments
Collective problems versus contained problems in health
Governments and intergovernmental organizations have 
different policy responses based on the nature and scope 
of the problem they are trying to tackle. In this section, I 
will first compare and contrast collective and contained 
problems, situate the epidemic of mental illness as a contained 
problem, then discuss world polity members’ response to 
it. The borderless nature of certain threats requires a range 
of coordinated international responses. Examples of these 
collective problems include global warming, infectious 
disease outbreaks, environmental pollution, and foodborne 
illness. When two or more countries share a problem, they 
look to each other or to international organizations to jointly 
formulate an effective solution. Coercive, competitive, and 
cooperative ways to address collective problems reflect both 
the functional interdependences and power asymmetry 
between actors in the world society. In the last section I already 
remarked on how international standards and principles 
could raise domestic standards. Foreign direct investment, 
trade and intellectual property policies increase competition 
for capital and export markets. Market competition could 
also have positive spillovers to each country involved, 
such as decreasing corruption and increasing research 
and development (10). Taken together, institutional and 
competitive bandwagons could stimulate both the diffusion 
and adoption of innovations. 
The second type of problem governments confront is largely 
contained within geo-political borders. Contained problems 
are concerns for which citizens turn to their government, such 
as pension reform, human rights legislation, economic reform, 
and gender mainstreaming. This study deals specifically with 
the prevalence of MNS abuse disorders. An initial question 
is whether actors in the world polity share a normative 
consensus that it is the government’s responsibility to provide 
services to address these disorders. A secondary question is 
whether third parties, such as international governmental 
organizations (IOs), voluntary associations, and professional 
societies, consider it necessary for national governments 
to meet a certain level of quality for the mental health 
services rendered. There is anecdotal evidence indicating 
that spillovers do happen across national and regional 
boundaries, in cases such as medical tourism, brain drain, 
multinational corporations offering health products and 
services, and humanitarian relief efforts, but the development 
and management of the mental health systems remain, for the 
most part, responsibilities of national governments. 
Mental health systems operate in a strong institutional but 
weak technical environment (11). The mental healthcare 
field has historically been fraught with a lack of clarity in 
the definition of mental disorders and in the therapeutic 
techniques given to manage symptoms and remedy illnesses. 
The WHO’s International Classification of Diseases and the 
American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual have undergone 11 and five revisions, respectively, 
to refine the diagnostic categorization of mental disorders. 
The construction of mental illness also goes hand-in-hand 
with gaps in providing preventive, therapeutic, and custodial 
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care for those in need. The ambiguity in determining the 
qualification for a clinical diagnosis also blurs the meaning 
of being in various states - healthy, sick, in treatment, in 
remission, and in recovery. Mental health treatment is 
considered to be a “soft technology” because the process of 
converting an input (i.e. sick client) to an output (i.e. recovered 
client) requires much more than administering psychotherapy 
and medication (12). It is perpetually challenging to tackle a 
contained problem (i.e. burden of MNS disorders) because 
its means-ends relationship with a touted solution (i.e. MNS 
health policy adoption) is unclear. 
Mental health policy
Psychiatric reforms began in the aftermath of World War II 
under the guise of modern healthcare that postwar societies 
are expected to offer their citizens. In many countries, this 
historically went hand-in-hand with social movements 
aimed at other marginalized groups in society, such as the 
emancipation of colonized populations, women’s rights, and 
civil rights. Mental health policy is an ofﬁcial statement that 
conveys a government’s values, principles, and objectives for 
improving the mental health of its citizens. Townsend et al. 
(13) have observed four broad, salient domains in national 
mental health policies: context, resources, provision, and 
outcomes. These domains can be further disaggregated 
into policy components: organization of services; human 
resources; involvement of users and families; advocacy and 
promotion; human rights protection of users; equity of access 
to mental health services across different groups; financing; 
quality improvement; and monitoring system. A universal 
mental health policy template or blueprint does not exist. And 
in recognition that not all policy domains and components are 
relevant to different cultural contexts, papers such as Jenkins 
et al.’s (14) have offered methods on how to appraise a country 
situation to ensure a good fit between a mental health policy 
and its health system. Room also exists to iteratively revise 
mental health policies so that their elements can withstand 
the test of time given finite resources and limited knowledge 
base available to governments. 
National policies have advantages over voluntary standards 
as IOs’ recommendations. Policies lend political support and 
visibility to the mental health sector. This formal commitment 
harmonizes the effort and investment different stakeholders 
make in mental healthcare. Mental health policy is also a 
mechanism to make governments accountable for allocating 
resources to meet stated goals, objectives, and targets. 
There are at least four ways in which policy-makers become 
aware of global “best practices” during the mental health 
policy formulation process. Man-made conflicts and natural 
disasters have been catalysts for the development of national 
mental health policy because countries are particularly 
vulnerable and need humanitarian assistance from non-
governmental actors during times of crisis. Humanitarian 
services lay the foundation for development assistance and 
protracted economic growth. In the case of mental health, 
what starts as psychosocial first aid, debriefing, and counseling 
to change the prognosis of trauma in the aftermath of wars 
or disasters are precipitous to the expansion of mental health 
services across the country (15,16). These seminal events 
ultimately bring international attention to the deficiencies in 
a focal country. 
Three other factors influence the process of policy-making. 
Pure learning occurs when policy-makers consult the research 
or grey literature for three types of empirical evidence 
that would substantiate their decisions: clinical efficacy, 
effectiveness, and policy research. Learning and emulation 
mechanisms interact when a focal policy adopter learns 
about the means-ends relationship from exemplar countries 
through venues that facilitate policy exchange and dialogue, 
such as seminars, conferences, declarations, and working 
groups. Learning and coercion interact when transnational 
collectives advocate for similar policy development across 
countries. Examples of these collectives are the International 
Consortium for Mental Health Policy and Services, the Mental 
Health and Poverty Research Programme Consortium, 
the Grand Challenges in Global Mental Health Initiatives, 
Platform for Innovations in Global Mental Health, and the 
Gulbenkian Platform for Global Mental Health. The key 
distinction between humanitarian assistance and the other 
three ways of influencing mental health policy development 
is that the former involves civil society and professionals, 
whereas the latter set is primarily funded and administered 
by IOs or countries. 
Theory and Hypotheses
Coercion
The world polity shapes countries’ identities, structures, 
programs, and policies via cultural and associational 
processes (3). Coercion stems from power and resource 
differences among countries, transnational and international 
organizations. Coercion can be further categorized as 
being vertical (i.e. between international organization 
and countries) or horizontal (i.e. between countries) (6). 
International organization membership and monetary aid 
flow are respectively chosen as the main measures of coercion 
in this study. The assumption behind asserting these coercive 
mechanisms is that national autonomy and sovereignty are 
largely absent.
 
Vertical coercion
IOs promote legitimated models, norms, and principles to 
their members. They disseminate standards through their 
ties with individual sovereign states, regional blocs, or multi-
member cooperatives (e.g. BRICS, MINT). They also employ 
a mix of financial and non-financial instruments to buttress 
their promotion of sector-wide reforms. 
The motto “no reform, no money” implies that countries 
must follow best practices or, at the very least, strive to meet 
IOs benchmarks - not doing so would jeopardize countries’ 
chances of receiving loans and structural adjustment 
packages. International financial institutions - most notably 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank—
and regional development banks make decisions about a 
country’s need for aid and set loan conditions oftentimes 
based on its standing in the international investment 
community (17). Taking development aid as an example, 
foreign entities have spent anywhere from one-third to one-
half of the African region’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
on developing its countries’ health and education systems 
(18). Aid-dependence is a double-edged sword: countries 
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comply with IOs’ directives either to receive a benefit (i.e. 
monetary sum, status enhancement) or to avoid a penalty (i.e. 
being blacklisted). Either way, aid-dependent countries have 
little bargaining power when confronted with the decision to 
either focus on donor-identified problems and international 
standards, such as the Millennium Development Goals, or 
remain true to their own set of priorities and cultural values. 
IOs ultimately shape policy in countries through aid, trade, 
foreign investment, and security. 
IOs also employ a range of  “softer” instruments to foster policy 
development (6,19). Gruber (20) argues that supranational 
institutions possess “go-it-alone” power, or the ability to 
unilaterally influence a government’s policy choice by altering 
the nature of the status quo it faces. IOs issue guidelines, 
rankings, quality scorecards, and target indicators to set said 
status quo. Weyland (21) called these instruments “availability 
enhancements” in the context of international financial 
institutions. These instruments are developed in cooperation 
with government agencies, academic institutions, professional 
societies, governing boards, advisory bodies, or expert panels. 
IOs ultimately help to lower the search cost of acquiring 
knowledge about policy practices taking place abroad by 
providing technical assistance on the usage of instruments 
and access to clearinghouse of statistical information to their 
member countries. 
The World Health Organization (WHO) is a United Nations 
agency charged with attaining the highest possible level of 
global mental healthcare since its establishment in 1946. 
WHO differs from other IOs in unique ways. It is one of the 
few IOs with the authority to reduce the global burden due 
to mental disorders1.  The WHO disburses moderate sums of 
money to build agenda-setting capacities and to encourage 
governments to develop new programs within their 
jurisdictions. However, the WHO does not have the same 
mandate as a donor, so the entity is unable to make long-term 
investments in mental health service development. The WHO 
does not issue laws and legal obligations, such as declarations 
of intent, treaties, conventions, contracts, and regulations 
that member states must obey. It does, however, involve 
third parties (i.e. regional commissions, other UN agencies, 
professional bodies, academia) to work closely with member 
states to produce ministerial declarations. Overall, the 
WHO plays an important role in harmonizing governments’ 
responses to health problems and minimizing discrepancies 
in policy-making efforts among its member countries.
The WHO’s strength lies in the assistance it provides to 
members during all stages of combating an epidemic: 
prevention, screening, treatment, and continuous care for 
people with diseases and disorders. More specifically, the 
WHO promotes discursive dissemination of health policy 
and inclusion of health in national agendas through various 
means: articulation of policy options based on evidence 
available; provision of technical assistance to countries; 
publication of policy guidance packages and checklists; 
commission research; strengthening international and 
intersectoral partnerships; hosting conferences and meetings; 
and monitoring and evaluating member states’ activities. The 
WHO Mental Health Policy and Service Guidance package 
1. Other IOs that oversee or have overseen mental health and psychosocial support projects 
include UN agencies (i.e. UNICEF, UNRWA, UNAIDS), EC, and the OECD. 
and the Mental Health Policy, Plans and Programmes module 
explicitly inform country stakeholders on how to formulate 
a national mental health policy. Given the WHO’s role in 
moving ideas across national borders, country membership 
in this international organization is related to policy diffusion 
following this hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The earlier a country becomes a member of the 
WHO, the more likely said country will adopt a mental policy.
IOs have an influence on state members by shaping their 
understanding of health as a social concern. Hypothesis 
1 is proposed to capture the WHO’s holistic role as an 
international organization that helps build health system2. 
There are now 194 members of the WHO, of which 193 are in 
my study sample. In areas where IOs such as the WHO cannot 
impose policy innovations on governments against their will, 
peer-to-peer governmental influence may be a significant way 
to shape the focal government’s preferences. 
Horizontal coercion
Horizontal coercion is observed when two countries 
are involved in a donor-recipient relationship, and 
interdependencies between them are due to shared markets 
and capital flows. A small number of countries (e.g. U.S., 
Sweden, Japan) actively manage their impression by regularly 
inviting foreign counterparts to examine their programs and 
policies. These exemplars also coopt international institutions 
in order to indirectly motivate other governments to take an 
expected course of action. Donor countries and IOs have 
traditionally dictated the terms of financial support for 
healthcare improvement so that aid recipient countries have 
to either assume the “vertical” approach—disease-specific 
interventions - or the “horizontal” approach—broad-based 
health system strengthening (22). 
International aid is related to mental health 
policy development in two ways. The commitment of 
donor countries to assist recipient countries in poverty 
alleviation is a key tenet of the Millennium Development 
Goals, and will likely remain as one of the Sustainable 
Development Goals, both adopted by the United Nations. 
Owing to the bi-directional causality present between poverty 
and mental ill health, the WHO has called for increased 
emphasis on those with MNS disorders as a development 
issue in low- and middle-income countries (23). Lund et 
al.’s systematic review (24) found inconclusive evidence of 
poverty alleviation interventions on mental health, but they 
did find an association between mental health interventions 
with improved economic outcomes. Nonetheless, opportunity 
exists for cross-pollination of poverty and mental health 
policy agendas (14). Second, despite a decrease in Overseas 
Development Assistance since the global economic crisis, 
donors are increasing recognizing the effect of Non-
communicable Diseases (NCDs) disability and mortality 
(25). National ring-fenced budgets for MNS disorders, a 
2. There is a strong degree of theoretical overlap among mechanisms of policy diffusion. 
The WHO could play a role in dictating the content of mental health reforms (“coercion”), 
encouraging the replication of a ‘gold standard’ (“emulation”), and/or disseminating prin-
ciples and country models (“learning”) available to policy-makers. The coercive and social 
emulative accounts would interact if the WHO employed a mix of persuasion and imposition 
strategies, respectively, to engender policy change among its member countries. I proposed 
Hypothesis 1 with the aim to capture the WHO’s overall role as an IO that helps build health 
system rather than to parse out and scrutinize the various manner in which the WHO has 
engendered mental health policy change since the latter is not fully codified in peer-reviewed 
or grey literature. 
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leading cluster of NCDs, exists, albeit as a low proportion of 
the overall health budget, in four out of five countries Raja et 
al. (26) surveyed. The burden of MNS disorders will continue 
to pose as a challenge for health system strengthening in 
different countries and regions (27). 
Given that concessions flow from bilateral or multi-lateral 
organizations to recipient countries, policy influence is 
hypothesized to follow the the same direction:
Hypothesis 2: The more Official Development Assistance for 
Health a country receives from an international organization 
and/or a donor country, the more likely that focal country will 
adopt a mental health policy.
The horizontal, coercive diffusion mechanism involves 
incentivizing recipient countries to better address mental ill 
health in their populations. 
Emulation
Diffusion theorists share the view that policy choices made 
in a focal country are shaped by choices made by those in 
other jurisdictions (5,6,28). The last section laid out the 
rationale behind overt and active forms of policy contagion, 
culminating in hypotheses 1 and 2. This section shifts the 
focus to more covert and passive forms of policy contagion. 
Mimetic isomorphism is the tendency to imitate another unit, 
in this case country, under the belief that doing so would yield 
benefits to the self (29). Emulation differs from learning, a 
form of instrumental compliance, in that the actor engaged in 
ritualistic copying does not fully comprehend the boundary 
conditions needed to achieve success. This is a pitfall of 
mimicking the success of countries that have already ratified 
mental health policy. In sum, adopting countries may induce 
non-adopting countries to choose the same exemplar policies, 
but not necessarily improve upon them. 
Status Differentials 
The policy diffusion literature is divided as to whether small, 
lower status units of analysis are more or less likely to adopt 
an innovation emanating from large, higher status units. The 
hierarchical diffusion hypothesis posits that innovations tend 
to appear in advanced centers, and successively disseminated 
to less advanced or smaller locales (30). This phenomenon has 
been observed in the United States, where more industrialized 
states adopted innovative measures before less developed ones 
because the former have more slack resources and access to 
information (5). Small states react by consciously mimicking 
larger states to demonstrate positioning behavior. 
Collier and Messick (19) argued the opposite: Units at lower 
levels of social, political and economic modernization would 
not adopt innovation. If only necessary conditions hold, 
there would rarely be any cases of policy adoption below 
a certain threshold, or a “floor effect”, but there would be 
great variation in the degree of modernization above said 
threshold. If both necessary and sufficient conditions hold, 
policy adoption tends to occur when countries reach the same 
level of modernization. Once a cluster of countries is at the 
cusp of making a certain commitment, that particular course 
of action becomes taken-for-granted and institutionalized; 
other social actors or governments will undertake the same, 
perceived as obligatory, course of action without extensive 
rationalization. I take a neutral approach in seeking to 
understand the probability and timing of mental health 
policy adoption based on the sampled countries’ prevailing 
social, economic, cultural, and political contexts. Secondarily, 
countries belonging to one of the five stages of adoption—
innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, and 
laggards—may differ on certain national characteristics (4). 
A “reference group” provides a benchmark against which 
other actors in the same population compare themselves to. A 
more nuanced question is whether laggards in policy adoption 
emulate countries of equal or higher status. Individuals 
compare themselves to reference groups of people who 
occupy social roles to which they aspire (31). Extrapolating 
to the country level of analysis, governments may imitate 
what selected countries do in mental healthcare because they 
are perceived to be both higher status and exemplars. Social 
network research on structural equivalence would support 
another claim that policy-makers tend to look to those who 
share a similar position when they are evaluating different 
policy options (31). There is also reason to suspect that 
governments imitate the practices of countries they have a 
similar social standing with.
Whether a country replicated the mental health policy of 
a peer or a superior could be inferred from the degree of 
homophily countries have with preceding adopters, suggesting 
the following proposition: 
Proposition: Countries that adopt a national mental health 
policy during the same phase in the diffusion cycle tend to 
display a higher degree of demographic resemblance to one 
another than to countries that adopt during other phases.
The internal determinants model posits that demographic 
characteristics of jurisdictions affect the rate of policy 
adoption (5,9). Intrinsic characteristics of countries are 
thus postulated to be independently responsible for policy 
adoption and will be treated as covariates in this study’s event 
history analysis.
 
Demographic Differentials 
In addition to temporal and structural factors, geographic 
proximity could explain an observed pattern and rate of 
mental health policy adoption. If diffusion travels along 
geographic lines, then proximate countries would come to 
resemble one another more than they would to distant ones. 
Neighbors are countries that share a common geographical 
border. Crudely speaking, neighbors compete with one 
another to attract “good things” and repel “bad things”. For 
instance, a negative spillover across jurisdiction lines occurs 
when the economy of one jurisdiction is in shock because it 
lacks a tax or fiscal policy that its neighbors recently adopted. 
Negative spillover is not a concern of this study because the 
burden of mental disorders is a problem contained within 
geopolitical borders and therefore a responsibility of the 
national government. However, the positive influences on 
policy adoption do span different levels of analysis. Policy-
makers’ susceptibility to peer influence is a function of the 
quality and quantity of social relationships they are engaged in 
(32). “Cosmopolitan” organizations are more likely to monitor 
comparable organizations. The information and material 
resources available in a common space helps governments 
overcome uncertainty—often in the form of negative public 
opinion—that they would encounter during the innovation 
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adoption process. 
The influence of geography on innovation diffusion is 
important for three reasons. First, policy diffusion occurs 
regionally when there is a clear exemplar within it (33). 
Second, proximity determines adoption when neighbors of 
the early adopter become increasingly aware of the utility 
of a given innovation (7). Policy-makers and citizens share 
a human cognitive bias towards evidence that is familiar 
and convenient (21). And finally, geographic proximity is 
likely to increase interaction and communication (8). The 
satisficing search for solutions to common problems becomes 
less arduous with inter-governmental interaction and cross-
pollination of national media syndicates. 
I tested geographic contiguity on mental health policy 
adoption to juxtapose innovation diffusion with spatial 
heterogeneity. In a federalist system, the probability of a U.S. 
state enacting a certain policy is increased when states within 
the same region have already enacted it (5,28). Mooney (34) 
is critical of the U.S. state policy research’s dogmatic stance on 
the regionalism thesis. There is also evidence both confirming 
(35,36) and disconfirming (19,21,33,37,38) a similar 
conjecture posed for regional blocs’ influence on national 
policy and regulatory development. The lack of consensus on 
this isomorphic variable is likely due to the level of analysis, 
scope conditions, and other factors that vary from study to 
the next. The regional effect is rekindled in this study not 
solely to preserve tradition, but also to see its relevance to the 
health sector.
Hypothesis 3: The higher the proportion of mental health policy 
adoption by countries in its regional bloc, the more likely a focal 
country will also adopt it.
Mental ill health, as a problem framed to be shared among 
neighboring countries or countries in the same region, is 
predicted to enhance chances of policy adoption in a focal 
country. Regional cumulative percentage is a measure chosen, 
which tallies the total number of countries in a country’s own 
region that have ratified mental health policy. This indicator 
was constructed for three sets of regions—WHO, UN, and 
geographic regions—which were separately included in 
statistical models. In particular, the potential effect of WHO 
regional offices on mental health policy development was 
tested as part of hypothesis 3, as well as hypothesis 1, because 
the WHO can be construed as either a unitary or collective 
agent. Graham (39) considered IOs to include more than one 
bureaucratic actor, and subjected to a high degree of internal 
fragmentation, as collective agents. IOs have multiple offices 
that are divided by geography and priorities, and the WHO 
is no different in that it is headquartered in Geneva, and 
has six regional and 150 offices in countries, territories and 
areas. Thus, authority is dispersed across global headquarters, 
regional-, and country-level offices. Regional Directors of the 
WHO are elected by representatives from their respective 
regions rather than by the Director-General or Assistant 
Director-General (40). The regional offices dictate country 
office budgets; indirectly dictating the portfolio of programs 
that translate policies formulated in headquarters (41). It is 
plausible that WHO country-level efforts are much closely 
connected to the goals espoused at regional offices than at 
headquarters. In sum, hypothesis 1 follows the assumption 
that the WHO is a unitary actor, while inherent in hypothesis 
3 is the assumption that the WHO is a collective agent3.
Methods
I examined the effects of coercion and emulation on the 
likelihood of mental health policy adoption for 193 countries. 
The first recorded mental health policy adoption took place 
in 1950 and the latest year for which data exists on the same 
event in other countries is 2011. I excluded South Sudan from 
my sample because it declared independence from Sudan 
as recently as July 9, 2011, the same year it became the 194th 
WHO Member Country and also the last year of my study 
period. Of the 193 sampled countries, 148 countries (77%) 
adopted a mental health policy during this observation period 
while 45 countries (23%) did not.
Dependent variable
The dependent variable for this study is the rate of national 
mental health policy adoption. The source of data is the 
WHO Mental Health Atlas (“Atlas”), which contains the latest 
estimate of infrastructure and resources available to prevent 
and treat mental disorders, and to protect the human rights 
of people living with those conditions. Atlas was published 
in 2001 (n= 185 WHO Member States), 2005 (n= 193 WHO 
Member States), and 2011 (b= 183 WHO Member States) (42). 
The wording of the questions on national mental health 
policy are inconsistent across the three cross-sectional 
waves of Atlas: while the 2001 and 2005 waves asked about 
the existence of a national mental health policy and, if yes, 
the year of its initial formulation, the 2011 wave asked about 
the existence of an officially approved mental health policy 
and, if yes, the name of the document and the year of its 
last revision. To establish the earliest mental health policy 
adoption, I cross-referenced the Atlas data with data from 
the WHO Assessment Instrument for Mental Health Systems 
(WHO-AIMS) and WHO MiNDbank. I used discrete-time 
event history analysis to examine the timing of mental health 
policy adoption and tested variables that may have led to the 
occurrence of this seminal event. 
Independent variables
The three primary independent variables of interest are: year 
of entry into the WHO, amount of aid given or received, and 
contagion effect within regions. To test hypothesis 1, I created 
a variable WHO_entry using the International Governmental 
Organization Data, version 2.3 (43) and WHO’s Basic 
Documents (40). The second major predictor variable in 
this study is the amount of aid both given to and received by 
sampled countries. Two types of aid were accounted for in 
this study: Official Development Assistance (ODA) and, as a 
subset of it, Development Assistance for Health (DAH). The 
Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development 
(OECD) Development Assistance Committee collects 
ODA statistics from 30 DAC member countries, 20 non-
DAC countries, 37 multinational organizations, and one 
private donor. I used data that were recorded from 1980 to 
3. The year of WHO entry (hypothesis 1 indicator) and contagion effect of WHO regions 
(hypothesis 3 indicator) are correlated (P= 0.3; P< 0.05). And so I built in a robustness check 
of the latter assumption by testing the effect exerted by UN regional offices or geographic 
regions on the same outcome. It is also worth noting that, as per Table 1, the three types of 
contagion effects are highly correlated: the Spearman correlation coefficient between WHO-
UN region is 0.82, WHO-geographic region is 0.94, and UN-geographic region is 0.85. All 
coefficients achieved less than a 0.05 statistical significant level.
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2011 to create the variable ODA to test hypothesis 2. The 
WHO also collects DAH statistics from 25 donor countries 
and 119 recipient countries from 2000 to 2010, which were 
respectively used to create variables DAH_given and DAH_
received to test hypothesis 2. Of note is that ODA and DAH 
record the amount of aid committed and disbursed separately, 
so I tested them separately in my analysis. All aid statistics 
were included in my analysis as either total net or percentage 
of Gross National Income.
Hypothesis 3 was tested using a measure of the contagious 
effects of regional reference groups. Previous studies on U.S. 
states, countries belonging to different regional blocs, and 
firms suggest that geographic proximity triggers contagion 
across populations. I thus created the regional cumulative 
percentage, which is a measure of the total number of 
countries in a country’s own region that ratified mental health 
policy. Three variables were constructed and included in my 
statistical model to see if a focal country’s decision to adopt a 
mental health policy was influenced by its neighbors in one of 
the six WHO (WHO_cumfreqper), 22 UN (UN_cumfreqper), 
or six geographic (GEO_cumfreqper) regional reference 
group. They were updated each year of the study period 
(1950–2011).
Control variables
Countries converge on the measure of mental health policy 
adoption due to similarities in their characteristics. I narrowly 
operationalized mimetic isomorphism as geographic 
proximity in hypothesis 3 and temporality as the dependent 
variable. To elaborate on the emulation argument, I controlled 
for a number of time-constant and time-varying factors that 
may have an effect on the adoption of mental health policy 
as part of the proposition. The 15 control variables I used fall 
into five areas: environmental conditions, quality of political 
institutions, social gradient, stage of economic growth, and 
population status. They are summarized in Additional file. 
The purpose of including this battery of control variables 
is to see if any of them moderated the relationship between 
the coercive drivers of isomorphism (hypotheses 1 and 2) 
or contagion effects (hypothesis 3) and mental health policy 
adoption. These extra-, inter-, and intra-country factors may 
have waxed or waned in their influence on mental health 
policy adoption throughout the study period. 
Analysis
I used discrete-time event history methods to test the effects 
of coercion and emulation on mental health policy adoption. 
Discrete-time event history analysis is an appropriate choice 
for my time-to-event data because policy adoption is a rare 
event that usually happens at the turn of the fiscal year. All 
variables were updated annually except for ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization, resulting in annual spells with time-varying 
covariates. Adoption was treated as an absorbing event 
whereby countries were removed from the risk set upon 
adoption of a mental health policy. In other words, a country 
is either censored because it adopted a mental health policy 
or because it reached 2011, the end of the study period, and 
has yet to adopt any mental health policy. I constructed and 
compared study periods resulting from a uniform (i.e. WHO 
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establishment in 1946, first international mental health policy 
adoption in 1950) or varied (i.e. year of sovereignty, year of 
last subordination) entry time. The year of sovereignty and year 
of last subordination were collected from the Issue Correlates 
of War Colonial History Data Set. I ultimately decided to 
start the study period with Japan’s unprecedented adoption of 
mental health policy in 1950, and instead capture the effects 
of WHO membership as an independent variable and the 
history of state independence as a control variable. I chose 
a functional form (i.e. time, time squared, and time cubed) 
for the baseline hazard function based on an examination of 
the occurrence of adoption during each year or interval (44). 
As the final step of the data preparation process, I tested for 
multi-collinearity among the predictor terms by regressing 
each independent variable on the other independent variables. 
If a high correlation between any indicators is observed, I 
estimated separate equations.  
My dependent variable Pi (t) is the discrete-time hazard that 
a country i adopts mental health policy at time t, given that it 
is at risk of doing so. Pi (t) is related to the covariates with the 
following equation:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )  1    Pi t i t j i t tβ χ β χ µ=∅ ∝+ +…+ +    
where Φ is the cumulative density function, α is the function of 
the spell, and the xi (t)’s are covariates that affect governmental 
adoption decision. I assumed that Φ (.) the cumulative density 
function for the error term is normally distributed, and I 
used a logit model to estimate the probability of adoption in 
a given year within a pooled sample (45). When analyzing 
panel data in which events occur at regular, discrete points 
in time, pooled cross-sectional logistic regression is the 
preferred method for event history analysis (46). The logit 
link estimates a discrete-time proportional odds model 
directly analogous to a Cox proportional hazard model, but 
I prefer the former because it can handle tied events and 
makes no assumption about the exact timing of an event, 
presuming only that an event occurred within a given interval 
(47). Because my dataset contains repeated observations on 
countries, I estimated robust standard errors using the Huber-
White sandwich estimator (48). This method allowed me to 
relax the assumption of independence of observations and 
yields asymptotically consistent estimates even when errors 
are heteroskedastic, as is often the case in diffusion processes. 
Secondary quantitative data were not available for predictors 
chosen for all country-years in the sample. And a complete 
case analysis of data not missing at random can lead to 
biased parameter estimates, a reduction in sample size, 
and larger standard errors. Therefore, I elected to perform 
multiple imputations after examining descriptive statistics 
for missingness pattern. The objective of multiple imputation 
is not to predict missing values so that they are close to the 
true values, but to handle missing data in a way that would 
result in valid statistical inference (49). I chose the Multiple 
Imputation by Chained Equation (MICE) approach over 
the multivariate normal modeling approach because the 
former better accounts for longitudinal data (50). I carried 
out multiple imputation in three sequential steps: formulate 
20 sets of simulated values, apply standard analyses to each 
imputed dataset, then pool the imputed datasets to obtain 
a single set of parameter estimates to account for missing-
Figure 1. Diffusion of mental health policy.
Note: 45 countries are non-adopters and 148 are adopters. Of the 
adopters, 5 are innovators (1950–7), 24 are early adopters (1960–
85), 62 are early majority (1986–98), and 57 are late majority (1999–
2011).
data uncertainty. For all resulting models, I looked to see if 
auxiliary R-squares are all below a 0.7 cut-off. I compared 
models using the likelihood ratio test to help determine the 
final baseline and multivariate models, which are presented 
in the next section. 
Results
Displayed in Figure 1 is the diffusion curve of mental 
health policy adoption globally. Descriptive statistics and 
a correlation matrix for the variables across all periods 
are presented in Table 1, while Table 2 shows the results of 
the event history analyses of national mental health policy 
adoption. In Table 2, model 1 includes only the control 
variables, model 2 contains a coercive variable, while models 
3 through 6 each contains an emulation variable, and model 7 
includes all predictor variables.
Figure 1 shows a discernible cross-national pattern in 
rates of diffusion. It helped verify that the frequency of the 
policy adoption over time is normally distributed, and that 
the cumulative distribution assumed an S-shape from 1950 
to 2011. This logistic growth curve holds for international 
mental health policy diffusion as the year dummies (not 
reported here) in all event history analysis models had 
negative coefficient in early years, positive coefficients in the 
middle, and negative coefficients toward the end of the series. 
The results indicate partial support for hypotheses of diffusion 
that stress multilateral relationships countries have with the 
WHO and bilateral relationships countries have with one 
another. All models in Table 2 were estimated with year as a 
quadratic variable because this particular functional form for 
duration dependence have more favorable deviance, Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC), and degrees of freedom when 
compared with models containing linear time, log time, 
and time dummies (45). Hypothesis 1 predicted that the 
earlier a country became a member of the WHO, the more 
likely the focal country would adopt a mental policy. The 
multivariate results show some support for this hypothesis: 
for every calendar year increase in WHO accession, there is a 
1.10 increase in the relative odds of adopting a mental health 
policy in year t given “survival” up to the end of the previous 
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calendar year was observed, as shown in model 2 of Table 2. 
However, the effect size was nullified after controlling for all 
the covariates in model 7. 
In hypothesis 2, I predicted that the more aid a country 
receives from another country or to an international 
organization, the more likely said country would have 
adopted a mental health policy due to conditionalities 
imposed on aid recipients by donors. I did not find support 
for this hypothesis using either the ODA or the DAH data. 
I chose to present only the ODA results in model 3 because 
of the limited time frame in which DAH data were collected. 
The coefficient of the logged amount of ODA disbursed, 
though not statistically significant, suggests that the 159 
countries that have received aid are equally likely to adopt 
a mental health policy as the other 34 countries. Likewise, I 
found similar coefficients and standard errors for aid reported 
to have been pledged or disbursed by 45 donor countries, in 
separate analyses not reported here. 
There are two caveats to these null findings. The first is that 
the architecture of ODA is complex: flows to developing 
countries and multilateral institutions are provided by official 
agencies, including state and local governments, or by their 
executive agencies. Each transaction supposedly meets two 
stringent tests: it is administered with the promotion of the 
economic development and welfare of developing countries 
as its main objective, and it is concessional in character and 
conveys a grant element of at least 25%. The second caveat is 
that mental health activities are not assigned its own sector 
code by the OECD Development Assistance Committee, 
thus making it difficult to estimate the magnitude of mental 
health-related activities in relation to other aid activities. 
Furthermore, health, population, and water and sanitation 
combined have a small part in the grand scheme of foreign 
assistance (51). 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that this interdependent effect to be 
more important over time with an increase in the density of 
countries that have ratified policy for mental health. I argued 
that regional cumulative percentage is analogous to “peer 
Table 2. Proportional odds discrete-time event history models predicting national mental health policy adoption
Independent variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
WHO entry year 1.10+ 0.82
(0.58) (0.57)
Log of ODA disbursed to recipient countries 0.15
 (0.10)
0.11
 (0.11)
Contagion effect - WHO region 2.83** 3.32**
(1.01) (1.25)
Contagion effect - UN region 1.76** 1.61*
(0.65) (0.66)
Contagion effect - Geographic area -0.32 -3.01+
(1.36) (1.64)
Polity score (regime type) 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Independence -0.08 -0.22 -0.08 0.00 0.05 -0.09 -0.04
(0.25) (0.27) (0.25) (0.25) (0.26) (0.25) (0.27)
World Bank income group 0.28 0.34 0.42+ 0.33 0.38 0.27 0.48+
(0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.27)
Log of disasters       0.19 0.15 0.12 0.18 0.14 0.20 0.13
(0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.19)
Instances of war       0.05 -0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.06 -0.02
(0.36) (0.34) (0.36) (0.37) (0.38) (0.35) (0.35)
Globalization Index 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Migrant: Total Population -0.27+ -0.26+ -0.23 -0.27+ -0.29+ -0.27+ -0.24
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Refugee: Total Population -0.09 -0.10 -0.11 -0.09 -0.07 -0.09 -0.09
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
UN Human Development Index -0.40 -0.51 -0.22 -0.95 -1.04 -0.28 -0.44
(1.49) (1.46) (1.49) (1.56) (1.51) (1.55) (1.60)
Year -0.06* -0.08* 0.06* 0.02* -0.03* -0.07* -0.05
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
Year^2 0.00 0.01+ 0.01+ 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Year^3 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -6.47** -6.95** -6.95** -6.96** -6.58** -6.47** -7.69**
1.00 1.15 1.09 1.13 1.04 0.99 1.24
Number of observations 6685 6685 6685 6685 6685 6685 6685
ODA= Official Development Assistance; WHO= World Health Organization
*P< 0.10, **P< 0.05, ***P< 0.01.
*Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All models were built after 20 imputations.
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pressure” among countries, whether it is countries within a 
single regional bloc or geographic area that might tend to 
imitate one another. Indeed, with everyone percentage point 
increase in the WHO regional percentage of countries, the 
rate of mental health policy ratification increases by almost 
2.83 (model 4) or 3.32 (model 7) relative odds. I also find 
evidence in support of hypothesis 3 for UN regional blocs: the 
contagion effect is 1.76 (model 5) or 1.61 (model 7) increase 
in relative odds of adopting a national mental health policy 
with every percentage point increase in the UN regional 
percentage of countries. These coefficients are statistically 
significant across models. Geographic regions seem to either 
have the opposite effect on mental health policy adoption, as 
evident by models 6 and 7, perhaps because countries are less 
inclined to reconsider their policy stance in the absence of 
top down, international organization influence. Overall, the 
proximity of one country to another seems important in light 
of shared membership in the same regional bloc.
Results for the country demographics variables offer 
weak support for a diffusion model that emphasizes status 
differentiation. The proposition posited a higher degree of 
demographic similarity between countries in the same phase 
of mental health policy adoption than countries in other 
phases. Statistically significant effects were observed for World 
Bank income group and migrants sub-population across the 
seven models. For every graduation to a higher income group, 
the relative odds of adopting a mental health policy in a given 
year increases by 0.42 (model 3) to 0.48 (model 7), holding 
other explanatory variables constant. For every percent 
increase in migrants relative to the general population, the 
relative odds of adopting a mental health policy in a given 
year decreases by 0.24 (model 7) to 0.29 (models 5), holding 
other explanatory variables constant. These findings indicate 
that the more diverse and prosperous countries are, the more 
likely they would adopt a mental health policy, presumably 
because mental health policy diffusion was better able to reach 
these countries due to greater access to information, slack 
budgets devoted to expanding mental healthcare, and robust 
infrastructures erected to buttress mental healthcare reform.
The results for the control variables show no support for 
the argument that a history of state independence—be it 
formation, colonization partition, or secession—or regime 
type have any bearings on the likelihood of mental health 
policy adoption. Post-colonial societies, in particular, did 
not inherit strong bureaucratic systems in mental health 
from its colonial rulers. Neither one of the two exogenous 
forces—occurrence of disasters and globalization—is a 
significant predictor of adoption. There is also no evidence 
that the various population measures, namely the proportion 
of refugees in the lay population and Human Development 
Index (HDI) score, significantly affected governments’ 
adoption decision. These results indicate that a particular 
constellation of extra-, inter-, and intra-country parameters 
is needed to cross the diffusion threshold in order for mental 
heath policy to be adopted.
Discussion and Conclusion
Countries exhibit similar a development in mental health 
policy despite marked differences in governance structures 
and economic growth trajectories. Policy convergence might 
be the result of independent responses from countries that 
face similar epidemiological, economic, and demographic 
transitions. However, comparative analyses of public policies 
across countries have revealed alternative explanations for the 
diffusion phenomenon. Policy diffusion research has shown 
that adoption is the result of mixed underlying processes 
involving independent adoption, dyadic emulation, and 
collective consensus (1,6). What all these pathways have in 
common is that actors are informed about the policy choices 
of other actors. Governments are likely to look to countries 
they perceive to have a high degree of homophily with 
themselves for solutions to shared policy problems, namely 
the burden of MNS disorders prevalent in their respective 
jurisdictions. Similarity in mental health policy could also 
be due to economic, institutional, communication, and 
professional linkages that bind countries. The spread of a 
policy innovation can be facilitated by IOs and regional 
blocs, which aim to level political and economic asymmetries 
among member countries. To date, international diffusion of 
mental health policy has not been examined conceptually and 
operationalized empirically for a large sample of countries 
even though the theory of policy diffusion is well established. 
The objective of this study is two-fold: describe the adoption 
pattern of mental health policy innovation over time, and 
analyze the factors that account for the empirically observed 
spreading process. 
The cumulative adoption of mental health policy over time 
follows an S-shaped curve. I tested myriad spatial, structural 
and socio-economic factors that could explain this particular 
adoption pattern among 193 countries over the course of six 
decades from 1950 to 2011. Internationally-driven initiatives 
can help raise awareness for mental health. IOs and regional 
blocs, in particular, can help shape diffusion processes above 
and beyond the technical and efficiency gains of mental health 
policy. In this case, mental health policies in the countries 
experienced changes following advice and consultation 
from the WHO. Multivariate regression results show that 
WHO accession has a weak association with mental health 
policy adoption, and secondarily there is a contagion effect 
among member countries in the same WHO and UN region. 
And thus it can be inferred that policy recommendations 
and norms around mental healthcare cascaded from WHO 
headquarters to regional offices, then to country offices, and 
finally to governments of its member countries. 
Aid transactions make up another pathway for countries 
to learn about policy innovations. Secondarily, there is a 
potential interaction effect between hypotheses 1 and 2 
based on evidence of strategic alliances in the United Nations 
Security Council that were formed based on foreign aid 
exchange (52). However, I did not find evidence in support 
of this hypothesis using either the ODA or DAH dataset. 
Bilateral, multilateral, and private donors stand to foster 
greater inclusion of mental health into their health system 
strengthening, disease-specific, and poverty reduction 
initiatives. This claim also deserves further testing for 
other disease-specific, economic development or anti-
poverty policies as there are still lively debates about the 
accountability, transparency and overall effectiveness of 
foreign assistance programs. 
Theorists in the policy diffusion tradition have also asked 
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whether policy convergence is observed for countries sharing 
the same boundaries. Previous studies have examined 
whether global (e.g. globalization) or regional (e.g. European 
integration) have any domestic impact. Policy innovation 
can transpire through influential ties between geographically 
contiguous countries for several reasons. Neighbors cooperate 
to assure consistency in policy regimes across their region. 
Neighbors also have unrivaled access to one another’s policy-
making environment for the purposes of social learning and 
peer comparison (7,28). Indeed, many countries either lead 
or follow the lead of others in their regional bloc (21,33,37). 
For these reasons, I operationalized geographic contagion 
in three ways and found the most pronounced contagion 
effect for WHO regions, followed by UN regions, but not 
for geographic regions per se. This speaks to the caveat that 
the coercive (hypothesis 1) and geographic (hypothesis 3) 
hypotheses are actually intertwined given that the WHO and 
UN behaved more like collective agents rather than unitary 
agents (39).
Converging policy developments are more likely for 
countries that are characterized by high degree of similarity 
in institutional arrangements and culture. This proposition 
held up for national income status and migrant sub-
population. The positive association between economic and 
mental health policy development is not surprising (42). The 
migration findings, however, deserve further consideration. 
Emigration involves far-reaching changes in conditions that 
surround a person, his/her family and community, including 
associated changes in climate, language, culture, status, 
and social relations. Early clinical literature on the subject 
matter concentrates on the adverse effects of migration on 
schizophrenia, and later expanded to look at depression, 
anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder. There are 
eight main hypotheses that suggest migration has a causal 
relationship with mental health: sending countries have 
high rates of mental disorders; mental disorder predisposes 
people to migrate; the process of migration produces stress 
and elevated rates of mental disorders; certain cultural 
practices of the migrant population get misdiagnosed as 
a mental disorder; some symptoms of mental disorders are 
more common amongst the cultures that migrants are from; 
ethnic density may play a role; concepts of self may influence 
prevalence; and aspirations and achievement disparity may 
influence high rates (53,54). Mental ill health among migrant, 
whether it is due to self-selection or the migratory experience 
itself, adds to the national prevalence of MNS disorders. 
Indeed, my results call for more evidence to address this 
policy problem, especially among countries receiving a high 
number of migrants. The absence of support for the other 
country demographic factors invites more research to support 
the proposition that policy innovations compatible with the 
experiences, values, ideas, and needs of host countries are 
more likely to diffuse. 
There are three limitations to my study. First, there is a strong 
degree of theoretical overlap among the mechanisms of policy 
diffusion tested. I used proxies to measure the ties among 
countries and between countries and the WHO. The degree 
of state openness, exemplified by mass media and diplomatic 
relations, is likely to change governments’ opinions of 
themselves, their peers, and their perceived leaders. Direct 
contact provides opportunities for up-to-date information, 
reliable advice, and tacit learning. Past scholarship on 
interdependence has also suggested that policy diffusion 
happens in the context of a network such that positions in 
common, overlapping networks can invoke new cognitive 
categories, social comparison, and competitive behavior 
(2,31,55). Future qualitative studies can make a finer grain 
distinction between communication and influence between 
the WHO and its member countries, and among member 
countries. Case studies can elucidate the factors that inhibit 
or promote the uptake of mental health policy as part of the 
national policy-making or cross-national policy coordination 
processes. In future work I hope to refine my estimates of 
mental health policy diffusion by considering networks 
that span jurisdictions. Teasing apart these processes would 
convey information on the potential to impact actions of 
national governments. 
Second, this study is very limited in terms of specifying the 
political mechanisms that facilitate or impede the acceptance 
of mental health policy. I used the year of initial mental health 
policy adoption as the indicator of diffusion. Components 
of the mental health policy that were added, deleted, or 
edited in the revision process are proxies of national policy 
selection processes. Future work remains with analyzing 
the number and types of policy components and content in 
each country’s mental health policy, which will be possible 
with the launch of MiNDbank. Not all processes may have, 
or have fully, manifested during the 61 year study period. 
Quantitative studies with more statistical power are apt to 
look at more complex forms of contagion, which entails the 
mutual reinforcement of multiple independent sources of 
isomorphism to furnish policy persistence. A new wave of 
data collection for WHO-AIMS is promising in this regard. 
In future studies I will exploit information on the distribution 
and determinants of adoption between mental health policy 
and policies related to it in order to validate the findings 
presented here. 
Lastly, my study does not speak to the effects of policies 
pertaining to diseases and disorders comorbid with MNS 
disorders, such as HIV/AIDS, and social factors associated 
with them, such as housing and employment. Novella (56) 
labeled the asylum model of care as “hyper-inclusive” because 
people served by it are under strict monitoring and control. 
The shift from this model to a community-oriented one meant 
granting more opportunities to people formerly marginalized 
to participate in other spheres of society. Society no longer 
prevented people with psychiatric disorders from earning and 
saving money, getting married and starting families, obtaining 
jobs or attending school, voting, and other entitlement of 
citizens. And likewise, MNS disorders have identifiable social 
determinants and protective factors, all of which need to be 
considered when developing intervention strategies. 
Mental health parity, recovery, and deinstitutionalization are 
not bounded and discrete movements. Rather, health has 
direct and indirect ties with other policy domains because 
people with MNS disorders need “continuity of care” or 
“wrap around services,” which are highly individualized, 
community-based services offered through agencies 
representing multiple sectors. This is especially the case 
for people who have been long-term residents of mental 
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hospitals and asylums, and thus deprived of social exchange 
with the lay community. The development of general public 
welfare services have enabled the deinstitutionalization of 
mental health services, such as poverty reduction, prisoners’ 
rights, disability pensions, public housing, old age pensions, 
unemployment payments, and universal health coverage. 
Ideological frames, tactical innovations, and/or organizational 
structures would presumably “spill over” from one policy 
domain to another if wrap-around services are coordinated 
across sectors. According to Jenkins et al. (14), opportunities 
are abound for mental health to be integrated with plans 
for other diseases and with national health plans, including 
sector wide approaches, international health partnerships, 
national strategy applications. Mental health could also be 
mainstreamed with initiatives in the education and welfare 
sectors, and with internationally agreed upon needs in poverty 
reduction, such as the Millennium Development Goals and 
their successors, the Sustainable Development Goals. 
Following this line of reasoning, broader questions than 
policy innovativeness and diffusion abound: What are the 
patterns common across policy domains? Do policies interact 
and jointly determine the likelihood of an individual policy’s 
adoption? The diffusion of mental health policy may be 
hypothesized to affect the rate, sequencing, and direction 
of another policy, and vice versa. There is ample room for 
theorizing on patterns of relationships between mental health 
and other types of policies. 
Diffusion scholars can continue to gain purchase on questions 
about mental health policy, and about processes that underlie 
its adoption within and across countries. Policy is not the 
sole object that diffuses across geopolitical borders. Its 
adoption also hinges on issue framing and theorized models 
of implementation. Policies that involve high distributional 
conflicts among domestic actors and actor coalitions tend 
to have a lower chance of being adopted than less contested 
regulatory policies (57). Policies that contain an idea easy 
to grasp and pose less of a challenge to embedded beliefs of 
domestic actors are easier to spread. Professional associations, 
research consortia, advocacy groups, and the media each play 
a unique role in shaping the cultural cognitive categories, 
funding structure, perceived costs and benefits, and metrics 
of success relevant to the policy-making process (58). There is 
ample room left for theorizing on the forces at play in policy 
diffusion, as evidence by the boundary conditions I examined 
in the case of global mental health. 
Mental health is a “triply marginalized” issue on the agendas 
of international organizations and most governments: 
MNS disorders are marginalized compared to other NCDs; 
NCDs are in turn marginalized compared to communicable 
diseases; and health is marginalized compared to other policy 
areas. Health sector reformers tend to extol the virtues of 
“silver bullet” interventions, such as antiretroviral treatment, 
Directly Observed Treatment Short Course, and insecticide 
treated bed nets. Policy-makers intentionally ignore the 
complexity in combating the AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria 
epidemic when they implement these silver bullets apart 
from community-based support and rehabilitation practices. 
The situation is much more dire for MNS disorders, which 
were left off the agenda of the UN High Level Meeting on 
Prevention and Control of Non-communicable Diseases in 
2011. Policy-makers do not readily grasp the chronic nature 
of NCDs. The long time it takes for the benefits of prevention, 
treatment, rehabilitation, and other multi-axial and multi-
sectoral interventions to be realized for individuals and for 
society is a disincentive for policy-makers, administrators, 
and professional to invest in preventing and treating chronic 
diseases. The inherent tension and competition for scarce 
resources between medical and public health communities, 
combined with cleavages between mental health and other 
medical professionals further perpetrate widespread stigma 
against mentally ill people and hinder further investment in 
mental health at both the planning and policy levels. 
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